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CONFLICTING THEORIES AT PLAY:
CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE AND





Many environmental laws and policies rely on citizen participation
in order to monitor industrial activity for possible adverse effects on the
environment and public welfare as a whole.1 Many environmental stat-
utes mandate public disclosure of industrial chemical use to aid citizenry
in its monitoring.2 However, trade secret laws protect businesses from
this exact type of public disclosure.3 The purpose of trade secret laws is
to protect information that can provide businesses with a competitive ad-
vantage in the marketplace because of its secrecy.4 In fact, the inherent
value of a trade secret is its confidentiality; the information is not readily
available to the public. As the value of trade secrets in business in-
creases, the more these two conflicting legal concepts will be forced to
operate in tandem.
The controversy surrounding hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is a
perfect example of this fundamental tension between environmental
“right-to-know” policies and trade secret laws.  Fracking is a process to
*Melanie McCormick is 2017 JD candidate at Golden Gate University School of Law with an
interest in intellectual property, cyber law and the environmental.
1 Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy Revolu-
tion, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, (2011).
2 Id.
3 Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 193, 200 (1991).
4 Ground Water Prot. Council & Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Comm’n, Hydraulic Frac-
turing: The Process, FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/ (last visited
Dec. 11, 2015) [hereinafter referred to as “FRACFOCUS WEBSITE”].
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enable oil and gas that was previously determined inaccessible to now be
extracted.5 Water, sand, and chemicals are pumped under high pressure
into a well bore causing rock formations to “fracture” releasing oil and
gas. The chemicals used by companies in the process are unique fluid
mixes designed for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the fracking
process.6 Because of the research and investment involved in finding the
most effective combination and proportion of chemicals in fracking
fluids, many companies claim a legitimate commercial need to protect
the formulas as trade secrets.7 However, as fracking has increased, so has
the public demand for information about the chemicals used in the pro-
cess. In recent years, fracking has become a hotly debated issue due to
concerns that the use of hazardous chemicals in the fracking process may
have negative environmental and public health effects.8 A recognized
need for greater fracking regulation has surfaced, but has also been met
with controversy.
Currently, there is no federal law regulating fracking. Instead, frack-
ing is only regulated under state law. Public disclosure requirements vary
widely from state-to-state.9 Some states have no disclosure requirements
at all.10 Of the states that do, most have included trade secret exception
provisions allowing oil and gas companies to refuse to disclose the
chemicals they use in fracking.11 More importantly, very few state laws
that have trade secret exceptions also require that the company provide
any substantiation that the trade secret is legitimate.12  Without some
kind of uniform factual substantiation requirement, what is to keep oil
and gas companies from abusing trade secret exceptions?
A possible solution has emerged.  In March of 2015, the Depart-
ment of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) released the first
important federal rules governing fracking on federal and tribal lands.13
The law only affects approximately 100,000 oil and gas wells in the
United States, but has already caused widespread concern among its op-
5 Id.
6 Wiseman, supra note 1 at 6-7.
7 Id. at 7.
8 Eric Schalbs, Legal Challenges to Fracking Regulation, Regblog.org, PENN PROGRAM ON
REGULATION (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/08/18/schlabs-fracking-regulation/.
9 Matthew McFeeley, The Disclosure Debates: The Regulatory Power Of An Informed Pub-
lic: Vermont Law Review Thirteenth Annual Symposium Vermont Law School — September 27,
2013: Falling Through The Cracks: Public Information And The Patchwork Of Hydraulic Fractur-
ing Disclosure Laws, 38 VT. L. REV. 849, 872-875 (2014).
10 Id. at 887.
11 Id. at 887-888.
12 Id.
13 80 FED. REG. 16128, 16128 (Mar. 26, 2015).
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ponents.14 Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, the Ute Indian
Tribe, and two oil and gas industry organizations have filed claims for
review of BLM’s rules in the U.S. District Court of Wyoming.15 The
arguments that have transpired offer a clear perspective into the contro-
versy surrounding chemical disclosure and trade secret exceptions.
Through analysis, it is apparent that BLM’s new fracking rule
should be uniformly adopted as a solution to the tension between disclo-
sure requirements and trade secrets. Part I of this Note defines hydraulic
fracturing and provides a history and background of the two conflicting
theories: trade secrets and environmental “right-to-know” policies. Part
II introduces the BLM’s new federal regulation and examines how it has
addressed conflicts between trade secrets and chemical disclosure. Part
III discusses the current problems with fracking regulations, and ad-
dresses how trade secrets and chemical disclosure play a part in its con-
troversy and why BLM’s new regulation can be a solution. This Note
concludes that BLM’s new regulation is a much needed and effective
compromise between the conflicting theories of trade secrets and chemi-
cal disclosure.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF TRADE SECRETS, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURES
Understanding the background and history of trade secrets and envi-
ronmental right-to-know polices is essential to understanding how they
conflict within the fracking industry. By understanding the ways in
which they conflict, we are better situated to understand how to formu-
late a successful compromise. The purpose of this section is to discuss
the basics of fracking, the reasons for trade secrets and public disclosure,
and to clarify some of the advantages and disadvantages in their
application.
A. WHAT ARE TRADE SECRETS AND WHY SHOULD WE CARE?
A trade secret is generally defined as “a formula, process, device, or
other business information that is kept confidential to maintain an advan-
tage over competitors[.]”16 Trade secrecy has always played an important
part in business, but legislators were slow to develop specific laws gov-
14 Coral Davenport, New Federal Rules Are Set for Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/21/us/politics/obama-administration-unveils-federal-fracking-reg-
ulations.html?_r=2
15 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of
America v. Jewell, No. 15-cv-41-SWS (D. Wyo. Mar. 15, 2015), ECF No. 13.
16 Trade Secret, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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erning trade secrets until the last few decades.17 Trade secret regulation
developed as a common law doctrine within tort law, and was first de-
fined in Restatement (First) of Torts in 1939.18 As a tort, trade secrets
have traditionally fallen under state jurisdiction. The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA), in an effort to establish uniformity in trade secret
protection due to its importance in interstate commerce, was approved
and recommended for enactment in all the states in 1985.19 To date, 48
states have adopted a version of the UTSA.20 The UTSA clarified the tort
definition by requiring that what can be considered trade secret informa-
tion must; “(1) derive[ ] independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by others who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the sub-
ject of reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to maintain its se-
crecy.”21 Federal trade secret protection is provided in the Federal Trade
Secrets Act.22 Under the Federal Trade Secrets Act, an officer or em-
ployee of any U.S. government agency can be fined or imprisoned, and
removed from office or employment, for disclosing confidential informa-
tion to any extent not authorized by law.23
Trade secret laws have increased in importance because of the value
of trade secrets in today’s market. Litigation for trade secret infringement
has escalated in the past decade and awards for damages are increasing.24
Although difficult to assess due to their confidential nature, the value of
trade secrets to a company’s portfolio is high and has increased dramati-
cally, along with other types of intellectual property, in the last two de-
cades. In 1975, the intangible property of the top 500 companies listed on
the S&P 500 comprised only 17 percent of a companies’ total value.25
But in 1996, it skyrocketed to 68 percent, and then increased even further
to 81 percent in 2009.26 If trade secret valuation is even a fraction of total
intangible property, trade secrets constitute a substantial percentage of
the value of today’s top companies. The definition of what is considered
17 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1092, 1092 (2012).
18 Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property To Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 193, 199 (1991); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
19 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1986)(4)(ii).
20 The only states that have not yet adopted the UTSA are New York and Massachusetts.
21 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1 (1986)(4)(ii).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2015).
23 Id.
24 Almeling, supra note 17 at 1093.
25 The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) is a stock market index based on the top 500
market-capitalized companies that have common stock listed on NYSE or NASDAQ stock
exchanges.
26 Almeling, supra note 17 at 1093.
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a trade secret has always been flexible and broad, but is becoming more
so as claims involving trade secrets and infringement are moving through
the courts.
One of the reasons for the escalation and expansion of trade secret
laws is changes in work environments. Whereas the earlier generations
of today’s workforce considered employment as being a life-long con-
nection to a single company, newer generations do not feel the same
level of job security, and value different ideals such as mobility and en-
trepreneurism instead of loyalty.27 This, along with the ease of data shar-
ing capabilities in today’s technology (e.g., flash drives that hold TBs of
data, or cloud storage), creates work environments where trade secrets
are no longer as secure as they were before. Employees who are granted
access to trade secrets within one company too often move and use that
knowledge in a competitor’s company.28
Less security and higher valuation has led companies to fiercely
protect their trade secrets. As a result, companies try to label anything
that can fall within the broad and flexible trade secret laws, as “trade
secrets.” Ostensibly, this also leads to a greater number of companies
trying to avoid disclosure laws associated with those “trade secrets” by
misusing trade secret exceptions. As the potential misuse of trade secret
exceptions rise, restrictions on how and when they are used becomes
increasingly more important as a way to protect the public. This is never
more apparent than in the contentious world of hydraulic fracturing.
Fracking is one of the most heavily debated topics in the U.S. today.
On the one hand, there are plenty of incentives to develop our nation’s
resources. Less reliance on foreign oil and gas is desirable, as is provid-
ing cheaper gas to the public. On the other hand, the increase in fracking
has caused environmental and public health concerns regarding the
chemicals used in the process, especially when the chemicals themselves
are designated as trade secrets and not disclosed to the public. But first,
we must understand what fracking is and how this process creates a ten-
sion between trade secrets and information disclosure.
B. WHAT IS FRACKING?
Fracking is the “use of fluid and material to create or restore small
fractures in a formation in order to stimulate production from new and
existing oil and gas wells.”29 Fracking is not the drilling itself, but rather
an extraction process once the drilling has been completed. Once the well
27 Id. at 1102.
28 Id.
29 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process.”
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has been prepared, a high-pressure water mixture is injected into the well
and directed at the shale rock to “fracture” it, subsequently releasing the
gas inside.30 The released gas is then recaptured through the well head.
The water mixture, called flowback, is flushed back up to the surface.31
The water mixture used per well consists of water, chemicals, and prop-
pant agents like sand.32 A single fracking project, or “frack,” may use
eight million gallons of water or more and four million pounds of prop-
pant.33 The chemicals make up only about 0.05 to 2 percent of the total
fracking fluid.34 However, when added to a six million gallon frack,
which is not uncommon, it calculates to 30,000 to 120,000 gallons of
chemicals that are used each time a well is fracked, and wells can be re-
fracked multiple times.35
Up to 600 different types of chemicals are known to be used in the
high-pressure water mixture, although each mixture typically only uses
about a dozen or so.36 Many of these chemicals are known to be toxic,
and their use varies greatly in type and proportion.37 With each well and
shale formation, operators encounter special issues that require research
and investment to obtain the most effective chemical formula to use.38
Once discovered, these unique formulas become very valuable when kept
confidential, giving the oil and gas company a competitive edge against
other companies. Under the UTSA definition of trade secret, fracking
fluids do constitute trade secrets.39 A fracking fluid is a “formula” and is
“information that is kept confidential to maintain an advantage over com-
petitors” that has an “independent economic value.”40 Because many
fracking fluids are considered trade secrets, companies can hide behind
trade secret provisions that allow them to segregate or altogether exclude
its formulas from environmental regulations. This is especially antago-
nistic because many environmental regulations are effective largely be-
cause of their public “right-to-know” provisions.
30 Well prepping, including cement casing is outside the scope of this article. See FracFocus
Website for more details.
31 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process.”
32 Id.
33 McFeeley, supra note 9 at 841.
34 Id. at 851.
35 Id. at 852.
36 Mike Soraghan, Groundtruthing Academy Award Nominee ‘Gasland’, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/24/24greenwire-groundtruthing-
academy-award-nominee-gasland-33228.html?pagewanted=all.
37 Wiseman, supra note 1 at 6.
38 Id. at 6-7.
39 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1986)(4)(i), (ii).
40 Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property To Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J. LAW & TEC 193 at 200 (1991).
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C. “RIGHT-TO-KNOW” ACTS: THE PURPOSE AND THEORY BEHIND
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC
The modern concept of disclosure and public access of information
started in the 1960s, along with medical consent laws, and consumer
warranties and labeling laws.41 One such statute, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA), was enacted in 1966 by Congress to provide any
person access to any documents held by the federal government, with
some listed exceptions.42 Like medical consent laws, and consumer war-
ranties and labeling laws, one of the main goals of FOIA is to enhance
the democratic process and increase participation through transparency.43
Environmental laws have built upon the same premise and purpose
of laws like FOIA to much success. By encompassing information dis-
closure, or “right-to-know” programs, environmental laws have taken an
effective step towards better environmental enforcement. The philosophy
behind information disclosure provisions is that by educating and in-
forming communities about public health and environmental concerns,
citizens are empowered to take more active roles in addressing possible
threats to their communities.44 Greater citizen involvement increases the
public awareness and scrutiny behind a company’s usage of hazardous
chemicals.
Moreover, environmental regulatory agencies often work best by
collecting, interpreting, and reporting information to the public.45 Envi-
ronmental law embraces the concept that environmental management
works best when its processes are not “unitary, top-down or exclusively
expert.”46 Although expert resources should be used, environmental
quality is best improved when there is active participation by the citi-
zenry of the affected community.47 As such, many environmental laws
that establish information-based regulatory strategies that include report-
ing and disclosure requirements, have been proven to work and have
become an essential part of many new laws, both state and federal.48
In order to have a successful public disclosure law, information that
is disclosed must be readily accessible and useable to the public. How-
ever, it also needs to include a mechanism for protecting trade secrets,
41 Mary L. Lyndon, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE (Matthew Bender), ch 4, Infor-
mation Disclosure and Access § 4.01. at 226 (Last updated Nov. 9, 2015).
42 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2015).
43 Lyndon, supra note 41 at 226.
44 Id. at 226.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 226-27.
47 Id. at 226.
48 Id. at 227.
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but one that requires substantiation that a true trade secret exists before
the exception is allowed. Further, for a law to be successful, it must in-
clude provisions that hold companies that use chemicals accountable for
any problems that may arise from their use.
II. A NEW FEDERAL REGULATION
In March of 2015, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) released
the first federal rule directly regulating hydraulic fracturing. BLM is the
administrator for over 245 million acres of federally-owned land and tri-
bal lands.49 Most of the land under BLM’s management is concentrated
in 12 western states.50 In addition, BLM manages over 700 million acres
of sub-surface mineral estates comprised of both federal and non-federal
lands.51 This section provides an overview of the Rule, and reviews spe-
cific provisions concerning chemical disclosure requirements and trade
secret exemption rules.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE RULE
In 2010, BLM started working on a new fracking rule in response to
the “growing public concern about the rapid expansion of complex hy-
draulic fracture.”52 The public comment period for the 2013 Proposed
Rule ended on August 23, 2013, with more than 1.5 million comments
from individuals and groups.53 BLM “reviewed these comments based
on thoughtful analysis and robust dialogue” and constructed a rule that is
more “protective than the previous proposed rules and current regula-
tions.”54 On March 26, 2015, BLM’s new rule was finalized (the
“Rule”), and set to become effective on June 24, 2015. The goals of the
Rule were designed to ensure that: 1) the wells are properly constructed
to protect water supplies; 2) the fluid that flows back to the surface is
managed in an environmentally responsible way; and 3) the public is
provided disclosure of the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluids.
According to BLM, “nearly 36 million acres of Federal land are
under lease for potential oil and gas development in 33 states.”55 As of
49 The U.S. Department of the Interior, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, The Bureau of Land
Management: Who We Are, What We Do, Blm.gov, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM
.html (Last Accessed Dec. 11, 2015).
50 Id.
51 Id. at “Subsurface.”
52 80 FED. REG. 16128, 16128. (Mar. 26, 2015).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 16129.
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June 30, 2014, BLM reports that there are approximately 47,000 active
oil and gas leases on public lands and about 95,000 wells.56 The Rule
applies to all oil and gas operations on public lands, and tribal lands.
Included are “split estate lands;” lands where the surface is owned by a
private entity, but the sub-surface mineral estate is owned by the federal
government.57
B. LANGUAGE OF THE RULE
The most important parts of the Rule that relate to chemical disclo-
sure and trade secrets address several areas: operator accountability, dis-
closure, the trade secret exceptions and its substantiation requirements,
third party trade secret holders, BLM’s retained authority, and the main-
tenance of records.
1. Operator Accountability
Under the Rule, the operator must submit the information to an au-
thorized officer within 30 days after the completion of the last stage of
hydraulic fracturing operations for each well.58  The information can be
submitted through a database like FracFocus, an oil and gas industry dis-
closure website,59 but it must be certified by the operator that the “infor-
mation is both timely filed and correct, and certify compliance with
applicable law as required by [the trade secret exemption section] using
FracFocus.org or another BLM-designated database.”60 The operator is
responsible for the information that is submitted, whether it is submitted
by a contractor or agent.61 This requirement adds a level of accountabil-
ity to the decisions made by operators.
2. Disclosure
The operator is required to submit the “total water volume used, and
a description of the base fluid and each additive in the hydraulic fractur-
ing fluid, including the trade name, supplier, purpose, ingredients, Chem-
ical Abstract Service Number (CAS), maximum ingredient concentration
in additive (percent by mass), and maximum ingredient concentration in
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i).
59 See infra notes 120-128, and accompanying text for further discussion of FracFocus.org.
60 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i).
61 Id.
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hydraulic fracturing fluid (percent by mass).”62 The purpose of this level
of detail is to ensure that the chemical information that is disclosed is
adequate enough to aid BLM in its management and to inform the public
as to what hazardous chemicals may be used and in what concentration.
3. Trade Secret Exceptions
Any information that is not deemed to be a trade secret will “have
waived any right to protect from public disclosure information”63  This
ensures that unless a legitimate trade secret exists, all information will be
subject to public disclosure. If “the owner of the information claims to be
exempt from public disclosure and [the information] is withheld from the
BLM, a corporate officer, managing partner, or sole proprietor of the
operator must sign and the operator must submit an affidavit[.]”64  This
is important because it makes the operator just as accountable for the
trade secret as is the owner of the information.
The affidavits must: identify the owner of the withheld informa-
tion;65 identify the Federal statute or regulation that prohibits disclo-
sure;66 and, “affirm that the operator has been provided the withheld
information from the owner of the information and is maintaining
records of the withheld information, or that the operator has access and
will maintain access to the withheld information held by the owner of the
information.”67  This last part of the provision is a good compromise
between protecting trade secret information, and making it available in
case of an emergency.  The owner of the trade secret does not have to
actually provide the information, which allows the owner protection. In-
stead, the operator has to certify that they have access to it, and that they
must maintain that access. This holds the operator accountable for pro-
viding the trade secret information if needed.
The rest of the trade secret substantiation provisions required in the
affidavits echo the definition of a trade secret:  the information is not
publicly available;68 the information is not required to be publicly dis-
closed under any law;69 “the owner of the information is in actual com-
petition and identifies competitors or others that could use the withheld
information to cause the owner of the information substantial competi-
62 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i)(1).
63 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i).
64 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(i).
65 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(i).
66 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(ii).
67 43 C.F.R  § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(iii).
68 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(iv).
69 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(v).
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tive harm[,];”70 and, “the information is not readily apparent through re-
verse engineering with publicly available information.”71
4. Third Parties
The Rule provides that, “if the operator relies upon information
from third parties, such as the owner of the withheld information, to
make the affirmations [under the trade secret exemption] of this section,
the operator must provide a written affidavit from the third party that sets
forth the relied-upon information.”72  This further solidifies the impor-
tance of the operator role and the operator’s ultimate accountability for
the fracking process.
5. BLM Retained Authority
The BLM has retained a great deal of authority to decide whether a
trade secret exception is legitimate. BLM “may require any operator to
submit to the BLM any withheld information, and any information rele-
vant to a claim that withheld information is exempt from public disclo-
sure.”73  The Rule further explains that “[i]f the BLM determines that the
information submitted [under the trade secret exemption] is not exempt
from disclosure, the BLM will make the information available to the
public after providing the operator and owner of the information with no
fewer than 10 business days’ notice of the BLM’s determination.”74  This
provision may be effective or ineffective.  It will largely depend on the
politics and personalities of the decision-makers at BLM.  But it does aid
public disclosure, and helps shape the intent of the Rule as a public
“right-to-know” policy, by making disclosure a default proposition.
6. Maintaining Records
The operator must maintain records of the withheld information un-
til BLM’s approval of a final abandonment notice, or six years after com-
pletion on Indian lands, or seven years after completion on Federal
lands.75 This is an important provision because it addresses the necessity
of being able to track possible long-term effects of chemicals on the en-
vironment. Lastly, “[t]he operator will be deemed to be maintaining the
70 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(vi).
71 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(1)(viii).
72 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(2).
73 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(3).
74 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(4).
75 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(5).
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records if it can promptly provide the complete and accurate information
to BLM, even if the information is in the custody of its owner.”76  Once
again, this emphasizes the importance of protecting trade secrets, but
maintaining access to them if an emergency arises.
These provisions are essential to any successful attempt at address-
ing the issues between trade secrets and public “right-to-know” policies
within the fracking controversy. This next section explores how fracking
has been regulated, why it is so important that we have a federal regula-
tion, and why BLM’s new rule is effective in combatting possible misuse
or abuse of trade secret exceptions.
III. PROBLEMS WITH FRACKING CHEMICAL FORMULA REGULATIONS
AS THEY ARE AND HOW BLM’S NEW RULE APPLIES
SOLUTIONS
A. The Loopholes of Federal Fracking Regulations
Before the release of BLM’s new regulation, fracking has only been
regulated by the states. The EPA, as a federal agency, would appear to be
the most logical regulatory agency for fracking because its mission is to
“protect human health and the environment.”77 The EPA even claims
that its purpose is to ensure that environmental protection is an integral
consideration in U.S. policies concerning natural resources, human
health, and energy.78 The problem is that when it comes to fracking, the
EPA has been systematically excluded. There are two prominent statutes
that would seem to give the EPA authority to require companies engaged
in fracking to disclose the chemicals used in their operations: the Emer-
gency and Planning Right-to-Know Act (EPRCA), and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA).
While the EPRCA contains chemical disclosure requirements, it
only incidentally applies to fracking operations. Under the EPRCA, the
EPA publishes the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a disclosure list that
records two categories of chemicals as they are managed, released or
transferred to other locations.79 Under the broadest category determined
by facility type, oil and gas facilities do not need to submit information
to TRI.80 Fracking facilities could also be required to report under the
76 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(j)(5).
77 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Our Mission and What We Do,
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
78 Id.
79 McFeeley, supra note 9 at 857.
80 Id. at 857.
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second category of chemical disclosure used for particularly hazardous
chemicals. However, reporting is only triggered if the chemicals are re-
leased and the release has exceeded the allowable threshold for that
chemical.81 Typical fracking operations may have several hazardous
chemicals within their fracking formulas, but each chemical individually
may not exceed the allowable threshold, so reporting rarely occurs under
the EPCRA.82
The EPA has some authority to act under the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) if there is a spill or an accident caused by fracking that
affects drinking water, but it does not directly regulate fracking.83 Critics
claim that in fact, “the oil and gas industry is the only industry in
America that the EPA allows to inject known hazardous materials – un-
checked – directly into or adjacent to underground drinking water sup-
plies.”84 This is because of what has been coined the Halliburton
Loophole. The name is believed to have originated through then-Vice
President Dick Cheney’s 2001 Energy Task Force.85
Since fracking is not specifically mentioned in the SWDA, in order
for the EPA to regulate it, it has to be defined as something under the
SWDA’s purview. The SDWA does have a provision regulating an “un-
derground injection” which is defined as “the subsurface emplacement of
fluids by well injection.”86 In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that
“underground injection” under the SDWA did in fact include fracking.
The court’s ruling caused the EPA to initiate a study into the possible
contamination of water supply through the fracking process.87 However,
when the 2004 study was released, the EPA concluded that fracking
posed little or no threat to underground drinking water sources unless
diesel fuel was used.88 This was all the legitimacy needed for Cheney’s
Energy Task Force to take action.
In July of 2005, at the recommendation of the Energy Task Force,
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which made all frack-
ing fluids, except for diesel fuels, exempt from the definition of “under-
ground injection” under the SWDA.89 Without a definition within the
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 5-11A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 11A.02.
84 The Halliburton Loophole, EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/
inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing#.VlIRd8uFNZc (last visited Dec. 11, 2015).
85 Id.; Dick Cheney was CEO of Halliburton before becoming Vice President of the United
States.
86 Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, § 1421(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300(h)(d)(1) (2005).
87 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. U.S. E.P.A., 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Cir. 1997).
88 5-11A TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 11A.02 at 2.
89 Id.
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SWDA, the EPA cannot require the majority of oil and gas companies to
disclose the chemical composition of their fracking fluids at the federal
level.90 Further, in draft guidance issued in 2012, the EPA uses a narrow
definition for diesel fuel, and admits that it applies to less than two per-
cent of fracking activities, as of 2011.91 The Halliburton Loophole has
effectively staved off the most obvious way to enforce the chemical dis-
closure of fracking fluids – through the EPA.
In 2013, members of the Senate did attempt to close the Halliburton
Loophole.92 The Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals
Act (FRAC Act) was introduced to Congress, but was never enacted.93
FRAC Act would have deleted the exemption for fracking in SDWA and
require that public disclosure of fracking chemicals be nationwide.94 As
it stands presently, the regulation of fracturing has been reserved entirely
for the states.
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH STATE FRACKING REGULATIONS
States have a vested interest in both the benefits and risks associated
with fracking. So what is wrong with the States regulating fracking?
State regulations governing fracking operations are very disjointed and
create even larger loopholes. Without federal regulation it is impossible
to determine the total number of states where fracking occurs.95 It is
believed that as of 2005, fracking occurs in more than 30 states.96 About
one-third of those states have no fracking chemical disclosure rules at
all.97 Of the remaining states that do have chemical disclosure require-
ments, very few involve disclosure prior to fracking, or notification to
the local community.98 States that require post-fracking reporting are va-
ried as to what time period after completion the information is required
to be disclosed. Louisiana requires that the information be disclosed 20
days after fracking completion.99 West Virginia allows 90 days. Indiana
requires that the information be disclosed immediately upon completion,
90 Id.
91 Underground Injection Control Program Guidance #84, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,451-02, 27,453
(May 10, 2012).
92 S. 1135 (113th): FRAC Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1135
(last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
93 Fracking Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act), S. 1135, 113th
Cong. (2013).
94 Id.
95 McFeeley, supra note 9 at 859.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 850.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 875.
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but has no enforceable point within the rule to determine when that is
exactly.100
Most states that have post-fracking chemical disclosure require-
ments, also have trade secret exceptions that require little, if any, factual
substantiation that the trade secret claim is legitimate.101 “Of twenty-two
states with fracking chemical disclosure rules, only four require any fac-
tual justification to be provided when making a claim of trade secret:
Arkansas, California, Illinois, and Wyoming.”102 In emergencies, trade
secret information, depending on the state, may be disclosed to certain
professionals. But even here there is a wide variance. Five states will
disclose trade secret information only to health professionals and not
emergency responders.103 Seven states will disclose trade secret informa-
tion to health professionals or emergency responders, but are limited by
what circumstances this information may be disclosed.104  Ten states, in-
cluding Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah, provide no access to trade
secret information to either emergency responders or health
professionals.105
The ability to access the data from chemical disclosure in a useable
way is also problematic. The Internet is now a uniquely suited tool that
may be utilized to generate public awareness of environmental and pub-
lic health concerns. How the data is presented to the public through the
Internet can have a profound effect on its usability. States vary on how
reporting data is collected, stored and managed, and its accessibility to
the public.106 “The benefits of public disclosure are unlikely to accrue
unless the information is available when it is needed and in a form that
facilitates its use and interpretation.”107 The most important indicator of
the usability of data is its ability to be searched and aggregated; the data
must be searchable, sortable, and machine-readable.108 Many state web-
sites that do disclose fracking data create hurdles to the effective use of
it. Researchers, regulators, or the public in general, may have access, but
in the present format of the data disclosed, it is nearly useless.109 For
example, five states provide records only in image format.110 For this
data to be analyzed in any meaningful way, all the information would
100 Id.
101 McFeeley, supra note 9 at 850.
102 Id. at 887.
103 Id. at 897.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 McFeeley, supra note 9 at 862.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 864.
109 Id. at 865.
110 Id.
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have to be re-entered into a database manually. Some states have
problems with search navigation or user-friendly interface issues.111
Databases could be set up to search in any number of ways that are
troublesome. For example, some states only provide searches based on
well identification numbers or geographical information like field, town-
ship, and range that the public is unlikely to know.112 If there is the
ability to search by county location, it often only identifies the latitude
and longitude of where the well is situated.113 Until data is disclosed and
presented in a useful way, the benefits of public right-to-know policies
have very little value.
C. HOW THE BLM RULE IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION IN
SOLVING REGULATORY PROBLEMS
The BLM Rule is the first step in solving the problems created by
varying state regulations and federal loopholes.  It may be the first fed-
eral regulation that directly regulates fracking, but it only legally affects
federal and tribal lands under the control of the BLM, a small portion
relative to the total private hydraulic fracturing projects thought to be in
operation in the nation.114  So how can this Rule that has such a limited
application create cohesion and close loopholes? The reason lies in the
perception of what the Rule may mean for other fracking regulations.
The Obama Administration and Interior Secretary Sally Jewell are hop-
ing the Rule will become the de facto standard.  In an interview about the
Rule, Jewell says that while the Rule only impacts public lands, “‘there
are a number of states where these may be the only regulations they
have.’ The onus for creating further rules, she said, ‘must now be taken
up in statehouses and boardrooms across the county.’”115 Some oil and
gas industry attorneys claim that the Rule can help bolster future claims
for both environmentalists and industry.116 The oil and gas industry can
use the Rule as proof of the federal government’s position that the risks
of unconventional drilling can, in fact, be mitigated.117 Environmentalists
can use the Rule as a benchmark to pressure state regulators into enhanc-
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4.
114 See 80 Fed. Reg. 16128, 16128. (Mar. 26, 2015); FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4.
115 Davenport, supra note 14.
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ing their current laws if inadequate.118  Further, the Rule may also spur
future challenges to industry trade secret claims.119
Additionally, the Rule recognizes the Internet as the most useful
way to publicly disclose information and has adopted, as well as recom-
mends, websites that have shown some strides forward in the access and
usability of chemical disclosure when it comes to fracking. Fracfocus
.org, is the recommended site proposed by the rule.  It was created as a
voluntary chemical disclosure site for the oil and gas industry to address
public concerns about fracking.120 Managed by the Ground Water Pro-
tection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, its
stated mission is “to provide the public access to reported chemicals used
for hydraulic fracturing within their area.”121
As with everything related to fracking, Fracfocus.org is not without
its critics. Environmentalists have criticized the reliance of states’ regula-
tions on Fracfocus.org, especially because it is a site created by the oil
and gas industry.122 A Harvard study addressed Fracfocus.org and con-
cluded that “it fails as a regulatory compliance tool.”123 Because of the
possible long-term effects of chemicals, disclosure records are only ef-
fective if they can be accessed when needed. As a private website,
Fracfocus.org could be taken down at any time and is not regulated like a
government agency. There are no audit trails, and there is little recourse
from public agencies if data is lost, corrupted, or inaccurate.124 Neverthe-
less, Fracfocus.org has been incorporated into 23 states’ disclosure rules
as the primary or sole location for reporting fracking chemical
information.125
In anticipation of the problems mentioned, BLM entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with Fracfocus.org before the Rule
came into effect.126 FracFocus 3.0 claims to expand the public’s ability
to search records, improve data accuracy, and allow “machine-readable”
formatted extractions of the data, all designed to enhance the public’s
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “Home.”
121 Id. at “Welcome.”
122 Davenport, supra note 14.
123 Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic Fracturing: FracFocus officials defend against Harvard criti-
cism, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (April 23, 2015).
124 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “Terms of Use.”
125 Id. at “Homepage.”
126 Amanda Stark, The Administration’s New Fracking Rule Has a Few Catches, THE
CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (March 23, 2015), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/ad-
ministrations-new-fracking-rule-has-few-catches.
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usability of the site.127  BLM will also keep its own copies of the dis-
closed information so that no data will be lost as a result of unexpected
website closures.128
D. WHAT ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS?
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of oil and gas drilling
in the U.S. largely due to advancements in hydraulic fracturing. It is esti-
mated that about 1.1 million oil and gas wells are actively producing.129
As of November 2015, Fracfocus.org, lists 106,132 registered hydrauli-
cally fractured wells.130 Hydraulic fracturing is an exceedingly effective
process, increasing the rate at which wells produce often by hundreds of
percent.131 However, there is ongoing controversy about fracking, and no
consensus has been reached between states, oil and gas industry, and
environmental groups. The oil and gas industry claim that fracking is
lowering consumer gas bills, stimulating job growth, and moving the
U.S. towards energy independence.132 Some state and local governments
actively encourage fracking, touting these benefits. Others, along with
environmental groups, express a growing concern about the environmen-
tal effects and public health.133
In New York, a seven-year study about the possible effects of frack-
ing have led regulators to place a ban on all fracking. New York officials
took the view that because the effects of fracking on water, air, and soil,
and public health are inconsistent, the possible risk was not worth it.134
In contrast, the state of Pennsylvania has embraced fracking as an eco-
nomic boom, since it, along with New York, Ohio, and West Virginia, is
situated atop the impressive Marcellus Shale, a huge source of oil and
gas.135 But recent studies conducted about Pennsylvania residents may
prove New York’s concerns were well-founded. For example, one study
showed that Pennsylvania residents living closer to wells had increased
127 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “2/26/2015 Major Improvements to FracFocus
Announced.”
128 Stark, supra note 126.
129 Matt Kelso, Over 1.1 Million Active Oil and Gas Wells in the U.S., FRACTRACKER ALLI-
ANCE (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.fractracker.org/2014/03/active-gas-and-oil-wells-in-us/.
130 FRACFOCUS WEBSITE, supra note 4 at “Home.”
131 Id. at “Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process.”
132 Schalbs, supra note 8.
133 Id.
134 Fracking Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act), S. 1135, 113th
Cong. (2013).
135 Freeman Klopott, N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking with Release of Seven-Year Study,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 29, 2015, 12:16 PM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-06-29/n-y-officially-bans-fracking-with-release-of-seven-year-study.
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hospital admissions to cardiology units than those who lived farther
away.136 Another study linked low birth weight in newborns to how
close their mothers lived to wells.137 Although these studies only provide
correlations as opposed to cause and effect relationships, they are merely
the first peer-reviewed studies of the potential health effects of
fracking.138
The biggest, and most obvious fear surrounding fracking is that it
contaminates groundwater and surface water. There have been instances
throughout the country that make this a legitimate concern. For example,
in Colorado, 84,000 gallons of fracking fluid sprayed out of a well in
Windsor for more than 30 hours after a mechanical failure.139 Although
the operators claim that they cleaned up the spill, it is uncertain if the
leak has contaminated the groundwater, or what other long-term effects
might have occurred.140 Supporters of fracking claim that this type of
leak is rare, and absent accidents like these, fracking is no more danger-
ous than conventional drilling.141
In another incident, a fire broke out at a Halliburton fracking site in
Ohio causing thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals to spill into a tribu-
tary of the Ohio River that supplies drinking water for millions of re-
sidents.142 An estimate of over 70,000 fish died as a result of the
chemicals spilled.143 Under Ohio state law, chemicals designated as trade
secrets do not need to be disclosed unless there is an emergency.144 How-
ever, Halliburton is only required to disclose the trade secret information
to emergency responders and the EPA, or its state counterpart, Ohio
EPA, who are forbidden from disclosing it to the public.145 Local water
agencies, area residents, and the private experts that were hired to moni-
tor the water contamination, were never given this proprietary informa-
136 Don Sapatkin, Pa. Studies Link Fracking with Health Problems, THE PHILADELPHIA IN-




139 Bruce Finley, Big fracking fluid spill near Windsor is cleaned up, company says, THE
DENVER POST (Feb. 14, 2013, 7:18 PM MST), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22593942/big-frack-
ing-fluid-spill-near-windsor-is-cleaned.
140 Id.
141 Pros and cons of fracking, SCIENTIFIC ALLIANCE, http://www.scientific-alliance.org/scien-
tific-alliance-newsletter/pros-and-cons-fracking (last visited Dec.11, 2015).
142 Mariah Blake, Halliburton Fracking Spill Mystery: What Chemicals Polluted an Ohio
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tion.146 Though Ohio state officials say that the chemicals are so diluted
now that the water is again safe to drink, critics acknowledge that with-
out knowing what chemicals are in the water, the drinking water utility,
and others who are monitoring the river, cannot determine if the levels
present are indeed safe.147
Through regulation, BLM’s Rule solves many of these concerns.
The Rule will get the right information, to the right people, at the right
time. Possible long-term effects of fracking chemicals on groundwater
used in wells can be tracked more efficiently because the operators are
required to maintain records of any withheld information for six to seven
years after the fracking has been completed. Additionally, the Rule re-
quires that the operator provide the records to the BLM “promptly” when
requested, even if the records are in the custody of the trade secret
holder.  This will assist emergency responders by giving them access to
the full spectrum of chemicals used, should a chemical spill or other such
emergencies surrounding the fracking process arise.  No more guessing
about what chemicals have been spilled.  No more hoping that surface
water is safe, because the right people have not been informed about the
chemicals that might be present.  Plus, BLM’s retained authority will
enable BLM to make the decision as to whether the operators or third
parties have made a legitimate trade secret claim.  BLM can decide
whether more substantiation is necessary or if a legitimate trade secret
does not exist and publicly disclose the information. Operators will be
held accountable for the information they submit for themselves, and on
account of third party trade secret holders.
IV. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding fracking has been the genesis of
BLM’s regulation. The fundamental tension between environmental
“right-to-know” policies and trade secret laws have borne a much needed
compromise within the Rule. Operators are now required to disclose the
chemicals used in their fracking fluids. If they want to be exempt from
disclosure, they have to certify that they (or a third party) have a legiti-
mate trade secret exemption, and provide factual substantiation in the
form of affidavits or other materials. The Rule’s factual substantiation
requirement will keep oil and gas companies from abusing trade secret
exceptions and operators have to maintain, or have access to, the trade
secret information in case it is required.
146 Id.
147 Blake, supra note 142.
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Although many states have recognized a public policy concern re-
garding fracking, and have even created legislation, the inconsistent ap-
plication across jurisdictions has created problems. BLM’s Rule is a
successful compromise between two conflict concepts, and is a step in
the right direction for future fracking regulation.
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